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Abstract 
 
When taxes on labor are introduced the tax wedge between labor costs paid by 
employer (gross wage) and net wage received by employee appears. At a certain level 
of wage, higher tax wedge on labor increases unemployment and decreases 
employment, ceteris paribus. The paper tackles with thee main questions: 
characteristics of tax wedge on labor, unemployment and employment rate in OECD 
countries in near past, tax wedge on labor policy in EU15 and new EU members and 
tax system and its effects on unemployment and employment rate in Slovenia. We found 
that OECD countries can be classified in two groups of countries if tax wedge on labor, 
unemployment rate and employment rate are taken into consideration. First group is 
high tax wedge, high unemployment rate and low employment rate group of countries, 
whereas the other group has alternative characteristics. European member states (old 
and new) have on average higher tax burden on labor than OECD average, 
consequently suffering from higher unemployment rates. Slovenia has unreasonably 
high tax wedge on labor; in EU only Belgium and Germany have a higher tax burden. 
According to previous and our empirical findings we suggest that Slovenia could benefit 
from lowering tax wedge. 
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1 Introduction 
 
When taxes on labor are introduced the tax wedge between labor costs paid by employer 
(gross wage) and net wage received by employee appears. According to OECD (2004) 
tax wedge on labor is the difference between what employers pay out in wages and 
social security charges and what employees take home after tax, taken into account also 
social security deductions and cash benefits. 
 
At a certain level of wage, higher tax wedge on labor increases unemployment and 
decreases employment, ceteris paribus. Actual effect of tax introduction depends on the 
elasticity of demand and supply curves and flexibility of labor market. In a perfectly 
flexible labor market, introduction of taxes would have only “quantitative” effect on 
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employment and there would again be no unemployed, because the quantity of active 
population would be set at equilibrium gross (and net) wage. But in reality labor 
markets are not perfectly flexible because of labor unions, mandatory minimum wage, 
perfectly elastic supply of work curve under a certain level of wage, etc. Therefore 
Vodopivec (2005) stresses that by creating a wedge between the costs of labor and the 
real consumption wage, labor taxes reduce the demand for labor and (if demand for 
labor is not perfectly inelastic) employment, increasing unemployment.  
 
OECD reports that tax wedges on labor have been falling in many OECD countries in 
recent years. This is helping to reduce a major obstacle to job creation and people’s 
willingness to work (OECD 2004). However, tax wedges are still significantly higher in 
most European countries compared to USA, Canada, Australia or Asian countries. 
According to IMF (2003) high unemployment rates in some European countries are 
attributable to labor-market protections, such as generous unemployment benefits, 
powerful labor unions and employment protection legislation. On the other hand, Baker 
and Schmitt (2003) argue that the IMF analysis is not robust enough; they claim that it 
does not give the same result if time period, sample of countries or econometric 
specification is changed in reasonable way. 
 
This paper tackles with thee main questions: 
1. What are characteristics of tax wedge on labor, unemployment and employment 
rate in OECD countries in near past? 
2. What kind of tax wedge on labor policy is significant for EU15 and new EU 
members? 
3. What kind of tax system is implemented in Slovenia and what are the effects on 
unemployment and employment rate? 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The third part of the paper – after 
description of data sources – discusses characteristics of tax wedge on labor, 
unemployment and employment rate in OECD countries in near past, the fourth section 
analyses what kind of tax policy regarding tax wedge on labor is significant for EU15 
and new EU members. The fifth section discuses what kind of tax system is 
implemented in Slovenia and what are the effects of such system on unemployment and 
employment rate. We sum up with concluding remarks and some policy 
recommendations. 
 
 
2 Data sources 
 
The analysis was based on three sources of data: 
1. for OECD countries, the data on tax wedge, employment rate and 
unemployment rate are OECD official data (OECD 2003),  
2. for new European Union members the data on tax wedge, employment rate and 
unemployment rate was obtained from data of Wiener Institut für Internationale 
Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW), 
3. for Slovenia, the tax wedge was calculated on the basis of current tax regulation, 
whereas data on employment rate and unemployment rate was obtained from 
reports of Statistical office of Slovenia. 
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All data is for year 2002. The data on tax wedge is comparable among countries, as they 
are all calculated for single individual without children at the income level of the 
average production worker. 
 
 
3 Characteristics of tax wedge on labor, unemployment and employment rate in 
OECD countries  
 
OECD is a variety of 30 countries, that differ economically (most of these are 
developed and minority of them are transition countries) as well as according to their 
definition of social state. Therefore is not surprising that tax wedge in these countries 
varies; it ranges from 16% (in Mexico) through as high as 55% in Belgium. OECD 
mean tax wedge on labor is 35,8% (see Figure 1 and Table 1; data for Slovenia is 
inserted for comparison). 
 
Table 1 shows a detailed picture about tax burden on labor end employment and 
unemployment rates in different OECD countries (and Slovenia; for comparison)1. In 
most countries tax wedge on labor consists of income tax and social security 
contributions, paid usually by employee and employer. Hungary and Poland have also 
payroll tax of 0,3 and 0,6%, respectively. It is interesting that countries have quite 
different structures of taxes on labor; coefficients of variation of different components 
are about 0,60, whereas (relative) variability of tax burden is much lower. This shows 
countries have a different perspective of what the appropriate structure of tax wedge is; 
on the gross level, however, differences are not so evident. 
 
What are characteristics of countries in the middle of tax burden distribution and the 
two groups on left and right tail? To answer this question we divided OECD countries 
in three equal groups (with high, mid and low tax wedge) and calculated average tax 
wedge, average unemployment rate and average employment rate. For groups’ break 
points 33rd and 66th percentile were taken.  
 
Figure 2 shows that there are no significant differences between unemployment and 
employment rates in OECD mid and OECD high group. However, statistically 
significant differences (at P = 0,00) may be found for OECD low group (compared to 
other two groups). Average unemployment and employment rates in OECD mid and 
OECD high group of countries are about 8,2 and 63,9%, respectively. In OECD low 
group of countries, however, average unemployment and employment rates are 4,4 and 
70,5%, respectively. 
 
This simple analysis confirms the hypothesis, that lower tax wedge corresponds to 
lower unemployment rate and higher employment rate. The results are comparable to 
Vodopivec (2005), Nickell and Layard (1999), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), 
Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Vodopivec (2003). It seems that for OECD countries the 
threshold of tax wedge is about 30%.  
 
Not to be misled by descriptive statistics cluster analysis has been applied to identify 
groups of OECD countries that are similar to each other with respect to tax wedge, 
unemployment and employment rates. Taking all three variables2 into consideration the 
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(statistical) distance between countries shows which countries are near or apart. Note 
that variables were standardized to avoid different averages influence the relative 
importance of a variable. 
 
Graphical representation of hierarchical clustering is presented by dendrogram (Figure 
3). The observations are listed on the vertical axis, and the horizontal axis represents the 
Euclidean distance between the centroids of the clusters (i.e. group averages). Large 
Euclidean distance between the centroids of the clusters is interpreted as a large 
difference between clusters; in this case observations are not supposed to be joint in one 
cluster.3 In our case it’s obvious that there are two groups of OECD countries, which 
confirms (however statistically firmly) our previous speculation. The characteristics of 
these two groups of countries are shown in Table 2. 
The first group is low tax wedge, low unemployment rate and high employment rate 
group of OECD countries, whereas the second group is the alternative one (high tax 
wedge, high unemployment rate and low employment rate group of OECD countries). 
Our empirical evidence shows, that (at least in OECD countries) countries with low tax 
wedge have low unemployment rate and high employment rate, and the other way 
around.  
 
If the empirical results are to be applicable for other countries, e.a. Slovenia, we 
developed a rule to classify countries in these two groups. For this purpose two-group 
discriminant analysis has been used.  
 
Equation 1: Estimated discriminant function 
ERURTWZ 125,0142,0101,0668,3ˆ −++=  
Notes:  1. Cut-off value for Z is 0. Countries with positive Z are high tax wedge, high unemployment 
rate and low employment rate group of countries. 
1. The analysis has predicted group membership with 100% accuracy (for OECD countries). 
Legend: TW – tax wedge, 
 UR – unemployment rate and 
 ER – employment rate. 
 
The likelihood of a country to be classified as high tax wedge, high unemployment rate 
and low employment rate country rises if tax wedge increases (which, according to 
theoretical and empirical expectations, causes also the increase of unemployment and 
decrease of employment, pushing up the likelihood even more). 
 
Here it should be stressed that the causality is obviously not a clear-cut. If all countries 
had the same ratio between sum of employed and unemployed with respect to active 
population, only number of employed and unemployed should be used to form groups. 
In this case the tax wedge would be considered an instrument, not an outcome! 
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4 Characteristics of tax wedge on labor in EU15 and new EU members 
 
The above analysis shows that EU15 countries (old EU members) are almost equally 
distributed in the first and the second group. High tax wedge, high unemployment rate 
and low employment rate group of countries are Greece, Spain, France, Germany, 
Finland, Italy and Belgium, whereas other countries belong to the alternative group. 
 
On average, European Union member states have higher tax burden than OECD 
average. Average tax wedge in EU15 countries is 40,5% (4%pts higher than OECD 
average) and for new EU members the figure is even a bit higher 44,3% (see Figure 4). 
The difference between tax burden in European Union member states and OECD 
countries is, we believe, the result of different factors, e.g. different definition of social 
state, different demographic characteristics, etc. 
 
We mentioned above the difference between average tax wedge on labor in EU15 
countries and new EU member states. The difference, however, is not statistically 
significant (P = 0,14). The insignificance is probably due to high variability of tax 
wedge on labor in EU15 countries,4 whereas the (relative) variability of tax wedge on 
labor in new EU member states is much smaller.5  
 
But when comparing EU (old and new member states) with non-EU OECD countries 
we found that tax wedge is higher in EU member states; the difference is more than 15 
percentace points and significant at negligible significance. The difference in 
employment rate are not significant, probably due to extremely high variance in non-EU 
OECD countries, but the difference in unemployment rate is obvious – EU member 
states have significantly higher unemployment rate (see Table 3). 
 
Here it is worthwhile to stress also that unemployment rate is quite high (on average) in 
new EU member states, even though not entirely caused by high tax burden, but also (or 
mostly) by other factors that “squeeze” all transition economies. 
 
 
5 Tax wedge on Labor in Slovenia 
 
In Slovenia tax wedge on labor is composed of personal income tax (paid by employee) 
and social security contributions (paid both by employer and employee). Unusually, 
Slovenia has introduced also payroll tax (paid by employer). Among OECD and EU 
countries such tax is used only in Hungary and Poland; it is, however significantly 
lower than in Slovenia (see Table 1). According to OECD methodology the tax wedge 
for single individual without children at the income level of the average production 
worker was estimated at 48,2%6 in 2002 (see Equation 2 and Figure 5). Regarding the 
fact that tax system has not changed much since early 1990’s, time dimension of tax 
wedge on labor in Slovenia does not show any significant trends or characteristics. In 
fact, the estimated tax wedge on labor for the same category of a worker in 2003 
accounted for 48,1%. This is due to the fact that taxes and benefits are mainly connected 
to average wages rather to be fixed or connected to e.g. GDP. Any significant change of 
tax wedge on labor would be caused only by a significant change of tax system. 
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Equation 2:  Calculation of tax wedge in Slovenia in 2002 (according to OECD 
methodology; for single individual without children at the income level 
of the average production worker)  
%2,48
 taxpayrollemployer of onscontributisecurity  social wagegross
 taxpayroll(total) onscontributisecurity  social taxincometax wedge =++
++=
 
 
Slovenia has the highest tax wedge on labor among new EU members (see Figure 5) 
and compared to EU25 countries tax wedge on labor is higher only in 2 countries 
(Germany and Belgium). Using both methods, i.e. discriminant function, which has 
been estimated for OECD countries, and cluster analysis (recluster OECD countries 
with Slovenian data attached) we can classify Slovenia in high tax wedge, high 
unemployment rate and low employment rate countries (Equation 3 and Figure 6). 
According to cluster analysis, Slovenia is most similar to Austria, France, Germany, 
Finland and Czech Republic when compared simultaneously with three parameters: tax 
wedge on labor, employment rate and unemployment rate. All these countries have one 
of the highest tax wedge on labor and above average unemployment rate amongst all 
OECD countries.  
 
This fact was stressed also by European Commission in latest Joint Employment Report 
(see European Commission 2005). It was explicitly pointed out that Slovenia still has 
above average tax burden on labor, although some progress has been achieved through 
the recent tax reform package.  
 
Equation 3: Estimated discriminant score for Slovenia (estimate for 2002) 
15,18,65125,09,5142,02,48101,0668,3ˆ =⋅−⋅+⋅+=Z  
 
Even though Slovenia has the highest tax wedge on labor among new EU countries, its 
employment and unemployment rate is not critical, compared to data from other new 
EU countries. Slovenia has much lower unemployment rate and higher employment rate 
than Slovakia or Latvia, for example, even though its tax wedge on labor is 5%pts 
higher. Compared to Hungary Slovenia has similar tax wedge on labor (only 2%pts 
higher than Hungary) and unemployment rate, but significantly higher employment rate. 
Compared to new EU members Slovenia is highly ranked economy despite relatively 
high tax wedge on labor. However, according to European Commission (2005) low 
employment rate (compared to EU15 countries), especially for persons over 55, is still a 
challenging problem in Slovenia. 
 
When comparing to OECD countries Slovenia’s estimated discriminant score is 1,15, 
whereas mean in the group of countries with high tax wedge, high unemployment rate 
and low employment rate is 2,31. This suggests that Slovenia is not far the cut-off point 
(i.e. not far from low tax wedge, low unemployment rate and high employment rate 
group of countries). In fact, with respect to employment and unemployment rate 
Slovenia is somewhere in between, but high tax wedge on labor pushes it up. 
 
These results suggest that Slovenia is on boundary; it has relatively low unemployment 
rate and relatively high employment rate with respect to tax wedge on labor. However, 
302
it would probably be difficult to lower unemployment rate and raise employment rate 
without significant change in tax wedge on labor. This could reduce a major obstacle to 
job creation and increase people’s willingness to work resulting in expectedly higher 
employment and lower unemployment rates. 
 
  
6 Concluding remarks 
 
OECD and IMF tudies have shown that higher taxes on labor, including unemployment 
benefit contributions, significantly increase unemployment (see OECD 2004 and IMF 
2003). This was confirmed also in this study; our empirical evidence shows, that (at 
least amongst OECD countries) countries with lower tax wedge have lower 
unemployment rate and higher employment rate, and the other way around. 
 
European countries have higher tax wedge, compared to OECD average. Average tax 
wedge in EU15 countries is 40,5% (4%pts higher than OECD average) and for new EU 
members the figure is even a bit higher 44,3%. Differences between EU15 countries and 
new EU members were not found to be statistically significant. 
In Slovenia tax wedge on labor is composed of personal income tax (paid by employee), 
social security contributions (paid both by employer and employee) and payroll tax 
(paid by employer). The later is also used only in Hungary and Poland, but here tax rate 
is 5-10 times lower than in Slovenia. Compared to OECD countries, EU15 countries 
and new EU members Slovenia has almost the highest tax wage on labor (for single 
individual without children at the income level of the average production worker the tax 
wedge was estimated at 48,2% in 2002). In our opinion this hinders more effective 
battle with unemployment. 
 
According to Vodopivec (2005), Nickell and Layard (1999), Daveri and Tabellini 
(2000), Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Vodopivec (2003) tax reduction could increase 
demand for labor and employment and lower unemployment. Nickell and Layard 
(1999), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Vodopivec (2003) 
argue that higher taxes on labor, including unemployment benefit contributions, 
significantly increase unemployment. Nickell and Layard (1999), for example, report 
that a 5 percentage point decrease in the aggregate tax wage (which includes payroll, 
income, and consumption taxes) would reduce the unemployment rate by 13 percent 
(for example, from 8 percent to 7 percent). They also argue that different types of taxes 
have the same effect on unemployment. If we apply Nickell and Layard’s analysis to 
Slovenia, a 5%pts decrease in the aggregate tax wage (that is from approximately 48 to 
43) could reduce the unemployment rate by about 13 percent (that is from 5,9 to 5,1 in 
2002).  
 
Thorough analysis of the influence of tax wedge on labor on employment and 
unemployment rates in Slovenia should maybe base on time series data for Slovenia. 
However, the fact that tax system has not changed much in last 15 years and there’s no 
relevant information for the period before 1990’s (because of incomparable economic 
system), our analysis could base only on cross section data. This analysis shows that 
only abolition of Slovenian particularity (payroll tax) would lower tax wedge for 
2,4%pts. But budget income of this tax accounted 93 billion in 2002, which is 
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approximately 8% of yearly budget. This is evident figure, why the government 
hesitates in abolition of payroll tax although employers and labor unions are constantly 
warning, that this tax (in combination with other taxes on labor) cause unreasonable 
pressure on labor market. Nevertheless, loss in budget incomes due to abolition of 
payroll tax would be compensated with savings on unemployment insurance and 
unemployment assistance payments due to (expected) lower unemployment and 
additional budgetary income from newly employed, probably also moved from 
undeclared work.  
 
One could argue that due to strong labor unions the reduction of tax wedge on labor 
would be passed on to net wages without any effect on employment. This could be the 
case of there would not be existing also a strong social partnership (represented in 
Economic and Social Council), therefore it is really unlikely that only labor unions (or 
already employed) would gain the positive effect; due to cooperation of social partners 
it is very likely that the effect would be also or primarily on employment. Besides that 
the social dialog in Slovenia usually prefers employment prior to the level of wages. 
 
Keeping the above figures in mind, Slovenia could reach low tax wedge, low 
unemployment rate and high employment rate group of OECD countries with the 
reduction of tax on labor for approximately 9%pts. This would, ceteris paribus, reduce 
unemployment rate to the mean of low tax wedge, low unemployment rate and high 
employment rate group of OECD countries (4,5%). However, this tax reduction would 
not be sufficient to increase employment rate to the group’s average. For this to happen, 
not only the unemployed should be reactivated, but also others, who are capable but not 
willing to work, should be encouraged to join (official) employment. 
 
To sum up, Slovenia should follow the trend, which is significant for OECD countries 
in recent years, where tax wedges on labor are falling, helping to reduce a major 
obstacle to job creation and people’s willingness to work (OECD 2004). However, only 
tax reduction probably would not be sufficient. In Slovenia (similar to many European 
countries as reported by (IMF 2003)) high unemployment rate is attributable to labor-
market protections, such as generous unemployment benefits, powerful unions and 
especially employment protection legislation.  
 
Notes 
 
1. For the purpose of further analysis also employment rates and unemployment rates 
are shown. 
2. Variables were standardized to avoid different averages influence the relative 
importance of a variable. 
3. For detailed interpretation of cluster analysis and dendrogram see Sharma (1996, p. 
185-232). 
4. Coefficient of variation is 0,21. 
5. Coefficient of variation is 0,04. 
6. We calculated the figure on our own, because officially published data from 
different sources (note that OECD data for Slovenia is not available) is not 
necessary comparable directly to OECD methodology. 
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Table 1:  Taxes on labor, employment rates and unemployment rates in OECD countries 
(and Slovenia) in 2002 (in %)1
Taxes on labor2
Social security 
contributions 
Country 
Income 
tax 
employee employer 
Payroll 
tax 
Total tax 
wedge on 
labor3
Employment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Slovenia 12,4 18,2 13,2 4,4 48,2 65,8 5,9 
Belgium 21 11 24 0 55 59,7 6,9 
Germany 17 17 17 0 51 65,3 8,7 
France 9 9 29 0 48 62,2 8,9 
Sweden 18 5 25 0 48 74,9 5,2 
Hungary 13 9 24 0,3 46,3 56,2 5,8 
Italy 14 7 25 0 46 55,6 9,1 
Austria 8 14 23 0 45 68,2 4,9 
Finland 20 5 20 0 45 67,7 9,1 
Poland 5 21 17 0,6 43,6 51,7 20,3 
Czech Republic 8 9 26 0 43 65,7 7,3 
Denmark 32 11 1 0 43 76,4 4,3 
Slovak Republic 5 9 28 0 42 56,9 18,6 
Turkey 12 12 18 0 42 46,7 10,6 
Spain 10 5 23 0 38 59,5 11,4 
Norway 19 7 11 0 37 77,1 4,0 
Netherlands 6 19 10 0 36 74,5 2,6 
Greece 0 12 22 0 35 56,9 9,8 
Luxembourg 7 12 12 0 32 63,6 2,6 
Portugal 4 9 19 0 32 68,1 5,4 
Canada 18 6 7 0 31 71,5 7,7 
Switzerland 9 10 10 0 30 78,9 3,0 
United Kingdom 14 7 8 0 30 72,7 5,1 
United States 15 7 7 0 30 71,9 5,9 
Iceland 21 0 5 0 26 82,8 3,2 
Australia 24 0 0 0 24 69,2 6,1 
Ireland 10 4 10 0 24 65,0 4,3 
Japan 6 9 10 0 24 68,2 5,6 
New Zealand 20 0 0 0 20 72,4 5,3 
Korea 2 6 8 0 16 63,3 3,2 
Mexico 2 1 13 0 16 60,1 2,5 
Average4 12,3 8,4 15,1 0,0 36,0 66,1 6,9 
Coefficient of 
variation4 0,6 0,6 0,6 4,0 0,3 0,1 0,6 
Notes: 
1  OECD countries sorted in descending order according to total tax burden. 
2  Taxes on labor represent the structure of taxes in employer’s costs of an employee. 
3  Tax wedge on labor is the coefficient between all taxes and social security contribution payments, 
paid by employer and employee, and total cost of an employee for employer. 
4 Parameters calculated for OECD countries. 
Source: OECD 2003, Statistical office of Slovenia, own calculations. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of two groups of OECD countries clustered with respect to tax 
wedge, unemployment and employment rates 
Group Tax wedge Unemployment 
rate 
Employment 
rate 
1  (n = 18) 30,2 ± 9,2 4,5 ± 1,4 71,0 ± 5,9 
2  (n = 12) 44,5 ± 5,4 10,5 ± 4,4 58,7 ± 6,1 
Total  (n = 30) 35,9 ± 10,5 6,9 ± 4,2 66,1 ± 8,5 
Source: Table 1, own calculations. 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of EU member states and non-EU OECD countries with respect 
to tax wedge on labor, and employment and unemployment rate 
Group Tax wedge Unemployment 
rate 
Employment 
rate 
EU member states 41,3 ± 7,8 7,6 ± 4,6 64,9 ± 7,4 
Non-EU OECD countries 25,9 ± 7,9 5,3 ± 2,5 68,5 ± 10,1 
t-test  -5,15  1,48  1,11 
P  0,00  0,05  0,14 
Source: Table 1, own calculations. 
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Figure 1: Tax Wedge on labor in Slovenia and OECD countries in 2002 (in %) 
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Source: OECD 2003, own calculations. 
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Figure 2: Tax wedge, unemployment rate and employment rate in three groups of OECD 
countries in 2002 (in %) 
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Source: Table 1, own calculations. 
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Figure 3: Dendrogram for OECD countries using Ward Method and Hierarchical 
Clustering 
                              Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
 
       C A S E         0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label           Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  Australia         2   òø 
  Japan            15   òú 
  Ireland          13   òú 
  New Zealand      20   òú 
  United Kingdom   29   òôòòòø 
  USA              30   òú   ó 
  Portugal         23   òú   ùòòòòòø 
  Canada            4   òú   ó     ó 
  Luxembourg       17   ò÷   ó     ó 
  Korea            16   òûòòò÷     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø 
  Mexico           18   ò÷         ó                                     ó 
  Denmark           6   òø         ó                                     ó 
  Sweden           26   òôòòòø     ó                                     ó 
  Austria           1   ò÷   ùòòòòò÷                                     ó 
  Netherlands      19   òø   ó                                           ó 
  Norway           21   òôòòò÷                                           ó 
  Iceland          12   òú                                               ó 
  Switzerland      27   ò÷                                               ó 
  Poland           22   òûòòòòòòòòòòòø                                   ó 
  Slovakia         24   ò÷           ó                                   ó 
  Greece           10   òø           ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ 
  Spain            25   òôòòòø       ó 
  Turkey           28   ò÷   ó       ó 
  France            8   òø   ùòòòòòòò÷ 
  Germany           9   òôòø ó 
  Czech Republic    5   òú ó ó 
  Finland           7   ò÷ ùò÷ 
  Hungary          11   òø ó 
  Italy            14   òôò÷ 
  Belgium           3   ò÷  
Source: Table 1, own calculations. 
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Figure 4: Tax Wedge on labor in EU15 countries and new EU members 2002 (in %) 
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Source: Table 1, WIIW, own calculations. 
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Figure 5: The composition of gross cost of work in Slovenia in 2002 (for single 
individual without children at the income level of the average production 
worker  
51,8%
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Source: Statistical office of Slovenia, own calculations. 
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Figure 6: Dendrogram for Slovenia and OECD countries using Ward Method and 
Hierarchical Clustering 
                               Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
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  Australia         2   òø 
  Japan             7   òú 
  Ireland           6   òú 
  New Zealand      12   òú 
  United Kingdom   17   òôòòòø 
  USA              18   òú   ó 
  Portugal         14   òú   ùòòòòòø 
  Canada            3   òú   ó     ó 
  Luxembourg        9   ò÷   ó     ó 
  Korea             8   òûòòò÷     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø 
  Mexico           10   ò÷         ó                                     ó 
  Iceland           5   òûòø       ó                                     ó 
  Switzerland      16   ò÷ ùòòòòòòò÷                                     ó 
  Netherlands      11   òø ó                                             ó 
  Norway           13   òôò÷                                             ó 
  Denmark           4   òú                                               ó 
  Sweden           15   ò÷                                               ó 
  Poland           27   òûòòòòòòòòòòòòòø                                 ó 
  Slovakia         28   ò÷             ó                                 ó 
  Greece           24   òø             ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ 
  Spain            29   òôòòòòòø       ó 
  Turkey           30   ò÷     ó       ó 
  Hungary          25   òø     ùòòòòòòò÷ 
  Italy            26   òôòø   ó 
  Belgium          19   ò÷ ùòòò÷ 
  Austria           1   òø ó 
  Slovenia         31   òôò÷ 
  France           22   òú 
  Germany          23   òú 
  Czech Republic   20   òú 
  Finland          21   ò÷  
Source: Table 1, own calculations. 
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